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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'IE STl\TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
RfCHARD H. NICKLES and 
'~RGARET K. NICKLES, 
Case No. 18666 
Defendants-Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants, Richard H. Nickles and Margaret K. 
:Hckles, appeal from the conviction and judgment of Aggravated 
~rson, a felony in the Second Degree, and Insurance Fraud, a 
'elony in the Second Degree, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
?<>ter F. Leary presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellants, Richard H. Nickles and Margaret K. 
~ickles, were tried and convicted of Aggravated Arson, a 
o~cond Degree Felony, and Insurance Fraud, a Second Degree 
Felony, in a trial from June 7, through June 22, 1982. 
·~~ellant Richard H. Nickles was sentenced to the indeterminate 
" c~ of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years and 
.·:0s fined $10, o o o 2cc pr-ovided by law for the crime of ll.ggravated 
,rson. He was sentenced to the indeterminate term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years and was fined $10,000 
as provided by law for the crime of Insurance Fraud. The 
sentences were to run concurrently. Appellant Margaret K. 
Nickles was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years and was fined 
$5,000 as provided by law for the crime oc Aggravated 
Arson. She was sentenced to the indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years as provided by 
law for the crime of Insurance Fraud. The sentences were to 
run concurrently. Her sentences were suspended upon serving 
six months in the Salt Lake County Jail and an indeterminate 
period of probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment rendered 
by the court below or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 30, 1980, at about 1:20 a.m., there was an 
explosion followed by a fire at the home of the appellants, 
Richard and Margaret Nickles (T. 73). The Nickles resided at 
4448 Crest Oak Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
No members of the Nickles family were home at the time. 
Margaret Nickles and the two Nickles daughters, Kimberly and 
Diana, had driven to California on October 27, 1980, to visi' 
friends and relatives (T. 1637, 1639, 2005). Richard Nickles 
stayed in Salt Lake City to attend to business (T. 279) and 
then flew to California on the morning of October 29, 1980. 
-2-
111s ciirport parking sticker was marked 10:35 a.m. (T. 1906). 
rrc flew instead of driving to California because his bad 
Lack made it painful for him to sit for long periods (T. 278, 
iG4J-42). Richard Nickles attended business meetings in Los 
Angeles on October 29 and 30 (T. 1638) and then flew to Santa 
Maria, Calfironia, where he was later joined by his family. 
The Nickles made typical preparations prior to their 
dc0arture. A neighbor boy, David Dickert, was asked to care 
for their cat (T. 153). Richard Nickles also offered the 
Dickerts a casserole that Margaret did not want to leave 
in the refrigerator while they were gone (T. 111). David 
picked it up from the flower box outside the front door (T. 155). 
Many lights were on in the house the evening prior to Richard 
Mickles' departure (T. 113). 
John Minichino of the local arm of the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) called Richard Nickles 
in California to notify him of the fire on the evening of 
October 30 before the rest of the family had arrived in 
Santa Maria (T. 531). Richard Nickles' immediate response 
was to inquire if anyone had been hurt (T. 511). He also 
expressed anger at the situation (T. 532). Upon being told 
of the fire, Margaret Nickles' reaction was tears and 
uncertainty (T. 1782). The experience was devastating to 
~''" "'lltire family (T. 1654). 
The entire family began the drive back to Salt Lake 
:ity together the following day (T. 1641). They arrived in 
Salt Lake City on November 2 around 12:30 a.m. (T. 514) · The 
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>1( i-c•n''L'r, no tests were run L1 the State's ·.,; 1 t;.esscs c;. 
il1ty, or its reaction to 0.Ct::.t.;.;ie r_:r :1n~: other l:Tclld 
or:t (T. 886, 1110, 1123) . 
• r.crs •3ble upon which a lamp was situated prior to the ~ire 
', _ 2 6) . Bilttalion Chief John r ngr1cht testified that he 
rcmu1ns of something red in the ·.·1c1nit~· G~ where the 
was fo~nd (T. 629). At the trial the appellants 
d•1-:.Ji a parsons table identical to the one th3t r.ad 'Jeer·. 
' d in the downstairs bedroom. 
:1Ld ~l)Und that it was composed of st'/rene plastic, ident:..c,1~ 
·h.~ 11eltcd milteri.:il in and around the "device" (T. : ':2'01 
'l·'•rr·d tra'' \vas absolutely flat, without c,·.·ider.ce of 
•r '"'idls (T. 1113-14). 
rndependent tests were conducted or. the st:r-rene t:lJst1c 
It was found that it is flammable and burns at atout 
l ·1 a test performed ilt trial, it was shown thilt acetoc.c· 
· t. r. the plastic table (T. 1861-62). Experts further 
that a 100 watt light bulb will reach an exterior 
264° to 266° F (T. 1500). A chemist tcst1~1ed 
'··s': he perfor:-:ied, it took 1 100 w;1tt light bult t·,.;o 
: ·teen minutes to :-:ielt through an identical parsor.s 
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when placed in acetone, leaving strands of material (T. l 'i73). 
Acetone further discolored the linings of the suitcases (T !' 
32, 1573). Acetone also dissolved part of the exterior 1 1 :.rn·· 
of the suitcases and the plastic tray contained in the rnake-u~ 
bag (T. 1542-43, 1571). In the opinion of a chemist, David Osbc: 
the suitcase lining had never been exposed to acetone (T. 1''51 
He testified that acetone, caught in bubbles in contact glue, 
could be the source of the acetone found in the lining IT. EJ" 
The experts further testified that acetone is a component o'. 
wood that is released when the wood burns (T. 1026, 1539). 
Carpet samples from the Nickles' home were also anal ·cc. 
The State's expert testified that this finding was more cornrle• 
than the analysis of the suitcase lining (T. 962). He found 
that there was a simply compounded mixture of hydrocarbons 
(Id.) This indicated the presence of solvents of the sane 
type (T. 963). Hydrocarbons are a byproduct of burning wood 
(T. 1043) but, according to this expert, these results were 
not consistent with just burni11g wood (T. 1045). However, r.c 
test was conducted actually burning the carpet exhibit (Id.). 
The defense expert testified that he conducted tests which 
found several substances: styrene, toluene, and possibly 
methyl styrene, but no acetone (T. 1541). The toluene found 
would be a normal vapor in a fire and the styrene would exist 
if there were styrene plastics in the home (T. 1542). 
The Nickles home was listed for sale at the time o: 
the fire. It was listed from May 15, 1980 to Septembe1· l9, 193 · 
(T. 349), and again in early October of 1980 (T. 305). The 
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1 15 1 ,nq ·1t the' time of the fire was for $239,000 (T. 321). 
· 11, , c d csL1tc agent at the time of the fire, Alice Blair, 
11,,,J , "" tu try to sell the house. The Nickles had declined 
'-~ h,,ld an open house when Margaret's parents visited (T. 328) 
and asked that the house not be shown while they were in Cal-
, fornia (T. 311). 
~he Nickles were not destitute at the time of the fire 
despite a $75,000 loan with a six-month balloon (T. 433). 
:,lcirqctret :lickles testified to assets of the family besides 
their business (T. 1951). The short-term loan was obtained 
ic1 I-,ugust of 1980 (T. 432-33). One payment was made on it 
IT. 438). The loan officer knew that the Nickles intended to 
~ay back the loan by the sale of the house (T. 444-45). 
Subsequently, in late Octobe~ the Nickles planned to pay off 
th~ entire loan with new credit they believed they could 
obtain (T. 445-57, 1946). The loan officer was advised of 
'.hie nPw arrangement (T. 446). No mortgage payments were 
~ade by the Nickles after the fire because of a shortage of 
,:ash flow due to living expenses incurred .(T. 1960). They 
~~re, however, in constant contact with the loan officer and 
~r~ 1u1te concerned about the situation (T. 452). 
The Nickles had insurance coverage in force on their 
'11J:".e ind •ir1 the contents of their home at the time of the fire. 
'.1urciarct Nickles' request in January of 1980, the insurance 
•rage had been increased due to the remodeling of the house 
(T 736). The limits at the time of the fire were $268,000 
c,n chp house with $134,000 on personal property (T. 661). The 
-9-
policy had increased from $250,000 to $268,000 due to ~ bui~t 
in inflation factor (T. 726). The Nickles had always maint _•,·._ 
a "cadillac" insurance policy on their home (T. 716) The "' 
provided coverage for a full year with payment due each Se~tP· 
After only a brief lapse because he forgot to pay the bill, "i:: 
Nickles submitted the premium due in September of 1980 IT. l).; 
The insurance coverage also included a $3,800 fur rider and a 
$7,280 silver rider (T. 658). 
The statement of proof of loss was submitted to Great 
American Insurance on December 30, 1980 (T. 1208). Al thougn 
Richard Nickles had requested additional time to prepare thE 
statement because of the complexity of the information, the 
emotional trauma, the necessity of finding other accommodat1crs 
(T. 1845), and lack of records available to the appellants 
(T. 1850), the insurance company refused to grant an oral ext2:,,_-
of time ('I. 694). Instead, they indicated that the Nickles wee.· 
have to apply for an ex tens ion ( T. 6 9 5) . The proof o:' 10ss VIC.S 
submitted under difficult and emotionally trying circumstances 
The appellants did their best to correctly docu:nenc the. 
losses. Only a few receipts could be found where the busir.ess 
account had been involved (T. 1930-31). The rest were lost ' 
fire. The appellants were told to utilize replacement costs • 3 :· 
than actual cash value on their personal property in the ~·r00'. .-
loss (T. 723). The appellants informed the insurance compari, l 
the column marked "source" on the proof of loss was actu.Jll·_ 
place where they had obtained the rerlacement costs crnd no' 
source of purchase (T. 1179, 1849). A witness ~ram HJrbara 
Interiors verified that the Nickles had contacted them (T. l~G' 
-10-
:;e, r.1] of U1' businesses, including the art appraiser, admitted 
t Ju 1 the'/ do not r ·c•cp i1 record of the telephone calls to ask 
:" ·s (T. l ilS, 1361, 1397). The proof of loss was prepared by 
i1•_ic1t c0 r p<cople, includin'i familj members and friends (T. 252, 
'ij .J 71 It took two to three weeks of full-time work by Margaret 
i:kles lu c:omplete it (T. 18 4 7) . The proof of loss was some two 
hundL~d ~·<l•JPS (T. 2 52) ' with over 1700 items listed (T. 1167). 
The claim was for $233' 350. 29 (T. G73). This was in line with 
tne bid obtained to replace the structure of $231,192.31 (T. 1911) 
3nd less than the total coverage. The silver claimed was $12,876 
1 T. fi 76) . Because of the manner and means by which it was prepared 
and uecause of the time constraints, the appellants acknowledged 
that there could, in fact, be errors despite their attempts to 
av0id them (T. 1847). 
one of the major items contained in the proof of loss was 
the claim for silverware. The arson personnel purportedly examined 
thE debris shovelful by shovelful looking for silver. Chief 
Unqricht testified that melted silver should have been in the 
rccmains (';'. 548). He further testified that fire personnel were 
very thorough and that it would not be possible to miss more than 
an isolated piece of silverware in the extensive search that was 
performed (T. 1826-27). However, over fifty pieces of silverware 
.. ~r· sul.:s1°CJuently found (T. 1650), together with trays, bowls and 
,JishPs (T. 1851). 
·.umerous witnesses testified not only to the extensive 
'"' dc·l1n'1 that had been done in the Nickles home. Their neighbor 
'" 1 Sl'cn sterling silver flatware, bowls, a tea set, and candelabra 
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within six months of the fire (T. 127-28, 146). She also 
verified that there were new draperies within three months 
of the fire (T. 130). A friend of the Nickles, Lynette:,.,,:, 
as well as Margaret Nickles described the extensive remodel1co 
that had been done in the home. This included new appliances, 
fixtures, and carpeting in the kitchen (T. 243, 1823-24); l~·: __ 
recarpeting and refurnishing the family room (T. 1825-26); 2r.·c 
new draperies throughout the home (T. 242, 1826). These fl.lee.:·. 
were seen by Lynette Daniel the Sunday prior to the Thursda; 
fire (T. 260-61). The furnishings in the home were described 
as a "quality decor" and "elegant" by the loan officer on th• 
$75,000 loan (T. 469). The draperies were further verified:· 
the son of the woman who made them; he hung them in the 'J1cL2, 
residence (T. 1712). Both he and his wife also verified thac 
there were two special paintings in the home (T. 1738, 17~9-5C1. 
At trial the State claimed that many of the belonqifcs 
claimed by the Nickles on the proof of loss either did not 
exist or did not exist in the quality claimed by the Nickles. 
These claims centered on the silver, the furs, the paintincs, 
designer jeans, and shoes. In fact, much of the silver was 
accounted for (T. 1850) with the exception of six place sett:C:' 
the presence of which is unknown at this time. Chief Ung re ·r.: 
belatedly admitted that insurance personnel had found the 
remains of fur and given those to him (T. 2040). The paint 1r .. c. 




'rhis w~s the value only of a copy, not the original 
3 
'etdl items, s11ch cis one of the paintings (T. 1943), 
t:cr, (T. 1864), left a protected area visible to the 
,csti'J"tors, but the actual item was missing. There was never a 
6 claim for designer jeans (T. 1787). Chief Ungricht testified 
Lhat his investigators never counted the remains of the shoes 
t_h,1t were fcund (T. 594). Lynette Daniel verified that Kim 
Nickles had about fifty pairs of shoes, Diana about twenty 
2airs, and 'largaret about forty pairs (T. 281-82). 
Subsequent to the judgment, which was entered in 
August 1982, ~nd subsequent to the f1l1ng of an appeal, the 
appellants' case was remanded from this Court to the Third 
Judicial District Court for a supplemental hearing on the issue 
of prosecutor1al misconduct. The remand was stipulated to 
bi' IJoth the appellants and the State. The proceeding occurred 
o:i April 1 and 7, 1983, before the Honorable James F. Sawaya. 
r~~ trial judge, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, recused himself 
from hearing this supplemental proceeding.
1 
The basis for the 
!nmacd and the appellants' subsequent motion for a new trial 
was Deputy County Attorney Michael Christensen's involvement 
~1t:h a ~rivate arson investigation company at the same time 
,Judcv L<>a1 y had presided over a motion to recuse the County 
0·t 1·e~,·; Office and Deputy County Attorney Michael Christensen 
1•1rally in another arson case, State v. Woods, Case No. 
_;J2-~9J, resulting in an order prohibiting Mr. Christensen 
.LGG '.urther prosecuting that case. See order dated November 12, 
118~ in the above-cited case. 
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as he prosecuted arson cases, including tho appellants', 
the County Attorney's office. 
Early in 1981 the private cirson firm got unJ, r 
Inc., (AFI) March 31, 1981 (Supp. T. 40). 
2 
The incorporator-
were Michael Christensen, his wife Virginici (both attor~~;s 
with the County Attorney's office then and now), and 
James Ashby, an investigator for t~c County Attorne~·is 
office (Id.) The filing letter was sent on stationer; a~ 
Mr. Christensen's as a private attorney with Suite C222 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice listed as an address and 1-.1'.:.l: 
two telephone numbers, one of which was the old Count·; ,-,tt:Jr-.· 
number (Supp. T. 39-42). The business was started because 
the County Attorney's arson investigators had been advised "h · 
their jobs as investigators might terminate in June 1381 
(Supp. T. 43) . 
. ".FI ;:;erformed eight in•1estigations (Supp. T. 471. 
March of 1981, they investigated both the Challis, Idaho 
theater fire and a fire in Paul, Idaho. Jim Ashb'/ was con L1 1_: 
in both these cases (Supp. T. 49). ~1r. Christcnsc:1 ~~s ~2:.l 
for the reports by AFI on these two fire invest inat1ons (Sup1 · 
T. 47-~8). The next in•f(cstigat1on was in l'iorL:rnd, 1-:-,·cr:i1rg, 
May or July 1981 (Supp. T. 50). 
Company hired him for the \-iorland fire arid :.1r. c_'hrist .. 11scn 
2. Citations to the su;:;plemental hecirln<j nrder1"l b-,· t:11s --
will be cited as Supp. T. 
-H-
1 od AFI again received payment for their work (Supp. T. 51). 
N· A~hby was again retained on an investigation of a fire in 
~end~r. Wyoming. In September 1981, AFI investigated a book 
store fire in Boise, Idaho and a residential fire in Cuna, 
.dciho (Supp. T. 53-54). Also in the fall of 1981 the Farmers 
Horne Insurance Company group retained AFI to take photographs 
-• fire scenes in Panguitch and Grantsville, Utah (Supp. T. 55-56). 
~s a result of the Cuna, Idaho, investigation, Mr. Christensen 
~esti:ied as an expert in February of 1982 (Supp. T. 54). Part 
of his qualifying credentials was his experience as a deputy 
county attorney (Supp. T. 54-55). Mr. Ashby, who participated 
in the investigation of the appellants' case (Supp. T. 76-77), 
also used his credentials as an investigator for the County 
.;ttorney's office to obtain work for AFI (Supp. T. 82-83). Once 
;rr•s existence was brought to the attention of County Attorney 
Ted Cannon, Mr. Christensen was notified to cease his private 
irvestigations in May or June of 1981 (Supp. T. 74-75). 
During about a four-year period that overlapped with 
;?I's existence, Mr. Christensen prosecuted about nine arson 
a~d insurance fraud cases with the County Attorney's Office 
I Suri·. T. 20). In 1979, he tried Ray Albert Long. In 1980, 
he triod Edward s. Dronzank. rhe Nickles were prosecuted in 
'une 1982 and John Troy was prosecuted in August 1982. Tracy 
~1rK1n was prosecuted in January or February 1983. He also 
rr1ad the Busboom case in the latter part of 1981 (Supp. T. 
~·J-.)11). i\t the time of the hearing, the Tony Beck automobile 
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d 1....·nnsist:=. o~ C'X 1:".11:--1:1t · 
-~ l cl: l . >~c-·3::-:e::, (5: 
I: 
11 this c:isc ~~11lcd to 11:--.k th _,. \ 
I•> ho appellants. 
1 : 1) whether the ex:_.~,_:.;_;_r·n .1'."'.-1 ::r+: ·,..·._·re Jrson-:::-J',jSt·J; 
:-t:, · 1rson issue, wht:ther thcr'--' \.w'JS .:..:-iS»J::-J.·- : !:".J...::i. 
n ;.;t:ilt' 1. :-1cC:irdall, ~ at 945, this ~2'-J!"'~ stJ':c·d 
,.,.,,(u1d ()\·L:'rturn u JUr:: 1 s ··erJ.1ct :)nl·~:' "·..,·he~ t!-.c- ···:::·_·~··· 
···~ i ·1q and insubstantial t~.1t 3 rcasoruble c-.:ir. ccu:d 
•_lie· '=-·-1SL' here. 
'..h•_ \~xr~·los1or. and :ire c:.ccurrcd i;-. the ~~1ck~2s hc~,c. 
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There is no evidence that the bulb was set u~ as a 
device. The State's own witness performed a test with a [,ulL 
and acetone where it was ignited in ten to twenty minutes, 
sixteen hours later (T. 1123). An expert defense witness 
testified that the bulb would have melted through the tabl0 
on its own in two hours and fifteen minutes (T. 1501). Thus, 
even if there were no acetone present, there would have been 
a hole through the table if that bulb had been left burning 
Richard Nickles left the house. 
Defense expert, David Osborne, tested both the so-cal> 
device and the table. He found that they were both primarily 
styrene (T. 1525). There was no evidence of another substance 
in the device that would indicate the presence of some type o! 
paint tray as theorized by the State. There was also no evldec.: 
of an accelerant in the device. The so-called tray was comple:' 
flat on the de•1ice without any indication that there were edycs 
that would have formed a tray (T. 1113-13). Acetone on the tac'.. 
itself would have dissolved the table (T. 1861-62). There was 
simply no evidence that the lamp had been sitting in any type 
acetone. In fact, there was nothing inconsistent with a bulb 
sitting on a table with crossword puzzles nearby. One of the 
State's own investigators testified that he saw some red matec:: 
nearby in the bedroom that was probably the shade that had 
originally been on the lamp (T. 629). 
Moreover, there was no evidence that acetone was userl 
an accelerant. There was inconsistent testimony on the 
so-called pour patterns with State witnesses saying there 
were trailers in the house and at the s2111e time saying that 
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cllc photographs depicted wavy lines which were not evidence 
r trctilcers (T. 631, 913). No acetone was detected in the 
If acetone had been placed on the parsons 
-,uJe, tests demonstrated that it would have dissolved the 
t~ble and there would have been a hole in it. An incredible 
amount of acetone would have been necessary to cause the 
explosion, anywhere from 450 gallons up to 2,250 gallons 
(T. 1888). 
These amounts clearly could not have entered the house 
in the suitcases that the State so carefully preserved, 
believing that they had been the vehicle for bringing acetone 
in the house. First of all, they could not have contained 
the amount that would have been necessary to cause the explosion. 
Secondly, the defense expert testified that acetone not only 
would have discolored the linings of the suitcases but also 
would have dissolved them, leaving mere threads (T. 1531-32, 
1573) . If acetone had been on the exterior of the suitcases, 
it would have caused a softening. There was no evidence 
chat ~ny of these effects had occurred. Instead, the evidence 
W3S much more consistent with the theory that the acetone in 
the suitcases was due to a release of the acetone caught in 
Lubbles in the glue. 
The cause of the explosion and fire is unknown. It 
cl~a1 that it was not caused as the State theorized; the 
nso experts' testimony was unre~utted It is possible that 
'••dS czii_;sed by swamp gas baclcing up into the home and creating 
+_he ccxr-los ion. However the blaze was caused, though, there was 
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insufficient proof as a matter of law to indicate that ther~ 
had been an arson. 
B. EVEN IF THE FIRE WAS ARSON, THERE 1'1AS 
NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE APPELLANTS 1'1E!"l.E 
RESPONSIBLE. 
This Court has recently reversed convictions where 
there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendants 
had committed the crimes. In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983), this Court found the evidence insufficient to 
support a conviction for second degree murder. In Petree, 
the victim was last seen when her mother dropped her off at 
the defendant's home. The only other incriminating evidence 
were statements the defendant made to family members and to 
a girlfriend some two years later. Id. at 444-45. In 
Petree this Court stated: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
Id. at 444. 
In State v. Linden, 666 P.2d 075 (Utah. 1983), t!ois 
Court reversed a conviction in an arson case based upon the 
insufficiency of the evidence. In Linden, black plastic 
cans found at the scene were later traced to Checker Auto 
Parts. The clerk at Checker remembered selling the cans to 
two men, one older and one younger. Although the younger 
was later identified as the codefendant, there was insufficient 
evidence to link the defendant with the sale or the arson. Id. 
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In this case, even if the explosion and fire at the 
•! 1 ,:kles' hone were caused by arson, the State failed to prove 
that the appellants were the persons responsible. No one 
saw anyone set up a device or pour any acetone in the home. 
The State claims that the lights in the house were on prior 
to Richard Nickles' departure because he was pouring acetone. 
This is total speculation. The only reasonable conclusion is 
that he was packing. The evidence clearly established that 
Richard Nickles did, in fact, fly out of Salt Lake to Los 
Angeles the morning of the 29th of October. It is obvious 
that he would have needed to pack the night before. Moreover, 
the evidence established that Richard Nickles was gone sixteen 
hours prior to the explosion at his home (T. 1906). There 
is no evidence that he had ever purchased large quantities of 
acetone or set up any kind of device. There was, further, no 
evidence presented by the State that any of his actions could 
h~ve caused a fire sixteen hours later. As noted in the 
previous section, under the State's theory of the cause of 
the fire, it would have to have been set much more recently 
than sixteen hours prior to the blaze. 
Moreover, the evidence established that Margaret 
~ickles had left for California on October 27 with her 
There was no evidence to indicate that she was 
~resent in Salt Lake city, or in her home, at any time within 
forty-eight hours of the fire. Thus, even if the jury had 
~ccepted the State's theory that Richard Nickles had set some 
kind of a device, there was absolutely no evidence that 
-21-
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The 2ppellants in tl11s CJ.SC ~3d 3dcquate, not cxccss1·:~, 
sur3~cc on their home. 
_it th·-.: ~Jicklcs had always had a "cadillac" insurJ.;-;ce: ::cl.:.c~ 
. 71G), in fact their policy covc~ed actual en~~~ 1~d not 
The amount of insura~c0 cc·.·ercd 
,-c3s<· 31-ter they had completed extcnsi·:e rcciorlel1:cc~ ~,c 
I ·c 736). This increase was ef~cct1\·e al~ost J. 
_,r ~-l~_:_-,_ re tr.c :ire. 
""er1:10d b~' friends and farnil~' of tr.c ::icklf;s (':'. lJG, ::::42-~2, 
1, 4,;9, 1712, 1733, 1749-50). 
~he proof of loss filed indicated no intent tc de!raud 
.~ur~ncc coMpany. The claim which consisted of some :J: 
~7on lines of items ~:as cxtcnsi·:e. 
thcr~ ~1~ht be errors ~here they co~plcted the c:31~ 
1:;_-,,,1t dc.J.l o: stress · ..;1thout J.n·/ _J_-:cor:1s and ir-, a ·:e~~· 
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short time (T. 1654, 1347). 
were covered for replacement costs or not, the)' wc·r·· t0lcJ [," 
an insurance agent to list the replacement costs IT. 723). 
The appellants explained to the insurance company that th~ 
source listed on the insurance claim was the source of thP 
replacement costs and not the source of purchase (T. 1179, 
1849). The State repeatedly tried to prejudice the jur:,- b1· 
presenting witnesses who testified that the Nickles did not, 
in fact, buy the items at the store. (See testirnon:,- of nine 
witnesses, beginning at T. 1251, 1321, 1332, 1336, 1349, lJS". 
1370' 1392' 1489). 
None of the major items questioned by the State su~pc -
a theory of insurance fraud. The State emphasized that the 
sterling silver claimed by the Nickles had not been found in 
the home and, yet, evidence was presented that the Nickles d1 
in fact, have sterling silver flatware and that six place 
settings of it were found safe in a floor vault (T. 127-28, Jj•: 
1648). Many other pieces of silverware (T. 1650) and bowls a:.c 
trays (T. 1351) were subsequently found. Where these were ~1ss 
by the State's investigators, it is certainl:,- possible that c~: 
were missed as well. The State further claimed that the Nickls' 
overstated the value of two paintings. However, the Nickl·2s c-
claimed these paintings as originals, which would have been ~c 
$40,000, but claimed them as copies which were valued at SJ, 
(T. 1228-29). The existence of the paintin,3s, as well as l!k 
silver, was verified by several friends and family members I~-
1749-50' 127-28' 146). Despite the State's allegations, t~ere 
remains of furs that were given to the fire personnel IT. c0401. 
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;;t,1tc' s investigators failed to count the remains of the shoes 
,1ind and thus raised mere speculation as to whether, in 
•,ct, the number of shoes was accurate. Further, despite the 
:~'0's allegations that there were no designer jeans in the 
hocie, there was no claim made for any designer jeans (T. 1787). 
The logical inference regarding the missing items is 
that they were stolen. The protected areas where the binoculars 
and paintings were indicate that they were present when the 
c1re occurred. The site was not secured for two to three 
·,.;ee;cs le'. 1661) The destruction was quite complete; any 
thefts prior to or subsequent to the fire would be difficult 
'.o detect. If the appellants were so anxious to collect 
the insurance money on a fraudulent basis, it does not make 
sense that they would claim items that would be questioned. 
P~rsons with a cri~inal intent would not risk detection. The 
honesty, and perhaps errors, of the Nickles indicated innocence, 
no• guilt, '.'.'he evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 
_u~~ort a verdict of guilty on the charge of insurance fraud. 
POINT II 
THE DEFUT'Z COU"TY ATTORCTEY 'S COt!FLICT OF 
I'\'TSi<EST l'I FROSECUTI~IG APPZLLi\cITS' CASE 
:·;,~?.?J\~~TS P.. ~~Lh' T?,IAL. 
Pursuant to this Court's order, the appellants' case 
'"- -.c._u·dcc '.'or a supplemental proceed.inc: on the issue of 
'rutoria! misconduct. The a~pellants challen0ed the propriety 
rosc>cutior. ~y De~uty County P.ttorney ~~ichael Christenscr:. \·:hen 
· ..:2s ir.·:o2-\'cC. \'lit~- a. ?rivate arson investigation firm 2.t the 
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same time as decisions in the appellants' case were made. 
subsequent to the evidentiary proceeding, the appellants mov0J 
for a new trial. The court denied the motion for a new triJl 
on the basis that it was untimely; the court 
further ruled that it would deny the motion on the merits if 
it reached them. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure §77-35-24(a) provides: 
The court may, upon motion of a party or 
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
The rule further requires that a motion for a new trial be filed 
within ten days after imposition of sentence or within such 
further time period as the court sets during the ten-day 
period. Utah Code Ann. §77-35-24(c). 
In this case, the appellants' trial counsel, James R. 
Brown, was not aware of the County Attorney's conflict of 
interest within the ten days of the judgment in the case in 
August 1982. In fact, he was not aware of the situation until 
November 1982 (Supp. T. 14). At that time, the Salt Lake Lcc,0'. 
Defender Association had been appointed to represent the appe lla 
on appeal. Counsel acted as expeditiously as possible, filin9 
both an extraordinary writ and, in the alternative, a motion t~ 
remand the appeal to the District Court for supplementary ev1d2J· 
tiary proceedings. It was the belief of counsel for the appci 
that a motion for a new trial was both appropriate given the 'o 
and necessary in order to preserve a le0al issue for appeal. 
motion was filed within ten days of the supplemental proceed1nc. 
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~lthough counsel for the appellants has been unable to find 
on; case law that specifically addressed the running of the time 
ueriod for a new trial following a supplemental hearing, the 
statute would be meaningless unless the motion is appropriate 
after such an evidentiary proceeding. This motion could not have 
been raised earlier as the substance was unknown to counsel at 
a prior time. There is no remedy for defendants when this 
situation arises unless the statute is construed as allowing 
a timely motion after a supplemental evidentiary hearing. 
The impropriety in this case had a substantial adverse 
effect on the appellant's right to a fair trial. This Court 
should grant a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor's 
conflict of interest in pursuing the appellants' case at the 
same time that he operated a private arson investigation firm. 
A prosecutor occupies a special role in our judicial 
system, with a duty not only as an advocate but also as a fair 
and just decision-maker. The Utah Supreme Court recognized 
this duty in Walker v. State, 624, P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981): 
We have previously stated that the State 
while charoed with vioorously enforcing 
the laws "has a duty to not only secure 
appropriate convictions, but an even higher 
duty to see that justice is done." In his 
role as the state representative in criminal 
matters, the prosecutor, therefore, must not 
only attempt to win cases, but must see that 
justice is done. Thus, while he should prose-
cute with earnestness and vigor, it is as 
much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as 
it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one. (footnotes omitted). 
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The California Supreme Court similarly places a 
duty on a prosecutor to be fair and just in his decisions. 
In People v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 561 P.?d 
1164, 1171 (Cal. 1977), the Court stated: 
Nor is the role of the proseuctor in this 
regard simply a specialized version of the 
duty of any attorney not to overstep the 
bounds of permissible advocacy. The prose-
cutor is a public official vested with 
considerable discretionary power to decide 
what crimes are to be charged and how they 
are to be prosecuted. In all his activities, 
his duties are conditioned oy the fact that 
he "is the representative not of any ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is 
as compelling as its obligation to govern 
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in 
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. 
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite 
sense the servant of the law, the twofold ai:n 
of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer." (cites omitted). 
Furthermore, Standard 1.1 of the 1971 approved draft 
developed by the American Bar Association for prosecutors 
specifically states: 
A prosecutor should avoid the appearance 
or reality of a conflict of interest with 
respect to his official duties. 
The Utah Legislature has likewise addressed the issue. 
Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4 (4) (1953 as amended) states: 
No public officer . . sh al 1: (a] ccept other 
emploYT:lent which he might expect would impair 
his independence of judgment in the performance 
of his public duties. 
Where such a conflict arises and is known before tr1J-
it is appropriate to recuse the prosecutor. In Contra Coste:, 
the court refused to order the trial court to reinstate a 
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,,rosccutor it had recused where an employee of the prosecutor's 
-'fire was the mother of the victim in a murder case and also 
witness for the State. More recently and of most pertinence 
to this case, the Third District Court (Leary, J.) ordered 
the same proseuctor as in this case recused in State v. Woods, 
case No. CR 82-593, under identical circumstances to those 
in this matter. (The order was attached as an exhibit to the 
appellants' motion at the Supplemental Hearing). 
When the duty to be impartial in fact and in appearance 
is violated but not raised until after trial, the defendant is 
entitled to a new trial. In \·/alker v. State, supra, the defendant 
~iled a writ and the court granted a new trial where the prosecutor 
failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant. In that 
case, the prosecutor failed to divulge the fact that a man's 
clothes were in the same room with a female defendant's clothes, 
even though defendant's defense to the distribution charge was 
"~at tho heroin found in that room belonged to another. In State 
~. Bain, 575 P.2d 919 (Mont. 1978), the court held prosecutorial 
nisconduct entitled defendant to a new trial where "the prosecutor's 
actions have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial." 
Id. at 922. In that case, the prosecutor continued to try to 
ictroduce evidence of defendant's parole status even though 
crdcr0d not to be the court. 
In State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) this 
couit reversed a conviction on theft by deception and announced 
µrcsecutorial misconduct would have constituted grounds for a 
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new trial if the convictions had not been reversed on other 
grounds. The appearance of impropriety is also grounds for a 
trial if the convictions had not been reversed on other oround 8 . 
The appearance of impropriety is also grounds for a new trial 
"[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt~­
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
In State v. Madry, 504 P.2d 1156 (Wash. 1972), the cour'. 
ordered a new trial in an assault case where the defendant 
discovered, subsequent to trial, that the trial-level judges 
had been investigating the hotel he owned for prostitution. 
The court stated that a judge must not only be impartial, 
but must also have the appearance of impartiality. The reaso~ 
is that "[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can be as 
damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice 
as would be the actual presence of bias or prejudice." Id. at 
1161. The Madry case is directly analogous here as the ,O.B.; 
standards and due process of law require that proseuctors as 
well as judges maintain an appearance of impartiality. 
The actual or apparent impropriety in this case entit:e' 
the defendants to a new trial. There is no way to know for sur. 
what impact the dual positions Mr. Christensen held had on his 
prosecutorial decisions in this case. GAD worked with Mr. 
Christensen on the appellants' case and simultaneously referrcc 
business to AFI. Mr. Christensen used his trainin<J and pos1·1. 
with the County Attorney's Office as credentials for testifyi 
as an expert in court on a case AFI investigated. '.lhere the 
overlap in knowledge and jobs is so great, there is at least 
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an appearance of conflict. An actual bias is supported by the 
ct 3 terncnt that Mr. Stroud made in the presence of county attorney 
~rsunnel that he wanted Richard Nickles in prison (Supp. T. io6) 
rh1s apparent conflict violated the appellants' right to a fair 
trial by due process of law pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The appellants have a right to the apparent 
and actual unbiased decisions of the prosecuting agency. The 
"substantial adverse effect" upon the appellants' right was denial 
of a fair and impartial prosecution and trial. If known prior to 
trial, it is clear that the prosecutor would have been recused as 
3 
rn State v. Woods, supra. The mere fact that the impropriety was 
onlj discovered post-trial should not deprive the appellants of a 
remedy. Moreover, the court has a responsibility not only to protect 
the aopellants' right to a fair trial, but also to see that public 
confidence is secure in the impartial administration of justice in 
this state. These two important functions could only have been 
~uaranteed if the appellants were granted a new trial in this case. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COUR'I' ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED THE 
TELEPHONE CALL REPORTED BY EILEEN RICE. 
Over objection of defense counsel, the trial court allowed 
admission of a telephone conversation reportedly made by Richard 
::1~k'.es (T. 864-65). Eileen Eice, secretary of ATF, had taken the 
;,•Jne call. The caller identified himself as Mr. Nickles. 
c. Prior to the printing of this brief, this Court reverse~ an arson 
nse involving the same deputy county attorney because of his prosec-
utorial misconduct during opening and closing statements. State v. Troy, 
'=as0 I.:o. 18738 (August 29, 1984). 
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Eileen Rice reported: 
He was asking about some articles that had been 
removed from his home and then mentioned to me 
that there had been a suspected arson at his 
home and that he had been suspect [sic] of it 
and commented that wasn't it lucky he had been 
300 miles away with the Secretary of the 
Department of Energy and that he would have 
needed a very long fuse or a time delay. 
Then, he again came back to the fact that 
these articles were missing and I asked what 
was missing and he said some silverware and 
other things, whole drawers full. And I told 
him I didn't believe we had them and that he 
said possibly they had been removed for safe-
keeping. 
I told him that I didn't think we had them, 
but that I would have John Minichino call 
when he got back to the office. 
(T. 1270-71). 
The trial court allowed admission of the contents of 
the phone call, citing 79 A.L.R. 3d 78 (T. 865) 4 and State v. 
Hess, 10 Col. App. 3d 1071, 90 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970) (T. 864) 
as authority. There is no Utah case law on point. This case 
is distinguishable from State v. Hess and more closely related 
to the factual situation of State v. Marlar, 498 P.2d 1276 
(Idaho 1972). In Hess defendants made a phone call to the 01;nc. 
of an Arabian mare named Ingaia. They expressed an interest i~. 
purchasing her, obtaining descriptions of her which they sub-
sequently used to obtain a duplicate registration certificate. 
They subsequently presented the Registry with a bill of sale 
4. 79 A.L.R. 3d 78 is, of course, a summary of law. ,\s discuc 
infra, the cases require more than identification by the caller 
without voice recognition by the recipient. The circumstances 
surrounding who would have knowledge of the contents of the caL 
is to be considered. See §20. 
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,·•J11taining the forged signature of the rightful owner of Ingaia . 
. ,'•·ndants then sold another horse purporting to be Ingaia. In 
·:e~~· th0 circu,~stantial evidence surrounding the telephone call 
01ntcd directly to the defendants and no one else, justifying 
cdmission of the phone call. They had obtained information which 
thee· used in the fraudulent sale. The information had not been 
~iven to anyone else, nor was it a matter of public knowledge. 
1 t '•das quite clear in Hess the defendants made use of the 
particular knowledge they had acquired during the telephone 
coriverscttion. 
State v. Marlar, supra, presents a different factual 
situation, more in line with the present case. In Marlar, the 
court admitted an alleged telephone conversation between the 
apoellant and the witness Higgins. The caller threatened to 
r~ut Higgins in the morgue. The phone call was admitted over 
counsel's objection to improper authentication. The court 
announced the general rule relating to admission of the 
suLstance of a phone call: 
The admissibility of telephone conversations 
is governed by the same rules of evidence which 
govern the admission of oral statements made in 
face-to-face conversations, except that the 
party against whom the conversation is sought 
to be used must ordinarily be identified. 29 
i\m. Jr. 2d Evid., §380, p. 431 (1967). (Emphasis 
added). See Tonkin-Clark Realty Co. v. Hedges, 
24 Idaho 304, 133 P. 669 (1913) . 
• J. at 1280. The most reliable means of identification is voice 
_:_d('nt1:=ication. Id. 
\'ithout voice identification, the general rule is that 
"m~re statement of his identity by the caller is insufficient 
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proof of the caller's identity." Id. at 1281, citi:1" (_'•ilL,:tJc 
v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank, 136 Tex. 263, 150 S.i-J. 2d 
771 (Tex. App. 1941); McCormick, Law of Evidence, .J05-0G (lO<J). 
If only the named caller has knowledge of the conversational 
contents, the phone call may be admissible. Id. Oregon has cic1·,· 
a de minimus rule pertaining to circumstantial identificaticn. 
State v. Glisan, 2 Or. App. 314, 465 P.2d 253 (1970). The coc:--
in State v. Marlar took a more cautious approcich, adopting a 
"clecirly corroborative" test regardinc; the admissibility of a 
phone call. The court considered clear identification of the 
caller, the subject matter of the conversation, and who woulc1 
have knowledge of facts reported in the conversation. 
In this case, Eileen Rice oould not identify Pichard 
Nickles' voice, nor did she place the phone call. The :; icklcs' 
number was published in the phone book. Newspapers and other 
media reported information on the Nickles being out of town 2l 
the time of the fire, thereby making that fact a matter of pub!: 
kno11ledge (T. 652). The contents of the phone call were, thcr 
not particular knowledge only Richcird Nickles 11ould r.avc. --r~ 
could have identified himself as Richard Nickles and conveyed t: 
same information to !·Is. Rice. Where Eileen Rice was unable to 
identify the voice or any particular mannerisms and the content' 
of the phone call were a matter of public knowledac, admissior 
of the phone call should have been d<~nied. Tl:ere 1vas r.o c•: -: 
evidence as in State v. :·larlar, ~, C:..:-\f, ~-;t3tc \'. Hess, ~ 
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POINT IV 
i\PPELLANTS WERE DEllIED !1 FAIR TRIAL BY 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
l\LLOWING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
A. IRRELEVANT AND IMr·:ATERIAL EVIDENCE 
During the trial, irrelevant or immaterial testimony was 
allowed into evidence over the objection of defense counsel. 
r1rst, a neighbor of the Nickles testified that the Nickles' 
home had lights on in several rooms at 3:00 a.m. on the night prior 
to Pichard Nickles' departure for California. The neighbor saw 
only that lights were on. She saw no movements or any signs of 
dctivity in the Nickles' home (T. 112-14). Second, the neighbor 
further testified over objection that she sent her son over to 
the Nickles to obtain a casserole which was offered to her by 
Pichard Nickles (T. 114). Third, an insurance agent was allowed 
t·o testify regarding policy coverage of a family room and a two-
cdr garage if the home were rebuilt (T. 660). The Nickles had 
converted their garage into a family room and had no garage on 
the home. No claim for a garage was made in the insurance claim.
5 
Fourth, although sustaining one objection (T. 1096), the Court 
r0~eatedly permitted the introduction of testimony regarding 
'ccelerants other than acetone (T. 1092, 1101). Fifth, the State 
•Os able to present testimony regarding the proximity of the 
·:1 lcs' business to Deseret Industries, a thrift store (T. 1690) 
1stl/, the State \vas permitted to ask Leo Thorup, the building 
~lthough defense counsel did not raise the objection ~ntil 
1tt0r the witness had answered, we urge the Court to consider 
chesc objections where there was no subsequent aili~onishment of 
the jury to disregard inadmissible evidence. 
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contractor who prepared a bid for replacement o[ the :iickl~s' 
home, if his bid included estimates of building the sume h~m~ 
in Arizona (T. 1922). 
Rule 1(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence in effect at 
the time of the trial defined relevant evidence as "evidence 
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the existcnc 
of any material fact." Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence i: 
effect at the time of the trial stated that the court had discr~: 
to exclude evidence if the "probative value [was] substantiall~ 
outweighed by the risk that its admission [would] ... (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues 
or of misleading the jury ... " 
There must be an abuse of discretion to reverse a trial 
court's admission of evidence. r~artin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977). The ;:>rinciples of two Utah cases a~c 
applicable here, even though each involved the trial court's 
exclusion of evidence. 
In Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 
1977) this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude 
immaterial evidence on ·>'leather conditions at the airport which 
was twenty miles from the scene of the plaintiff's fall on an 
icy sidewalk. In so doing, this Court stated " [ t] he weather 
report ... had very little, if any, probative value and it could 
have created a substantial risk of confusing the issues." Id. 
at 1141. 
More recently, in Reiser v. Lehner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982), this Court affirmed the exclusion of possible neglic:cncc 
-36-
1 n Fh antibody testing in a medical malpractice case for harm 
1 riH1ng from an amniocentesis test. The trial court had 
>:eluded the information because the Rh sensitivity did not 
cJuse the injury and any negligence by the doctors in 
diagnosis and treatment of the sensitivity was potentially 
prejudicial to the determination of medical negligence in 
causing the injuries suffered. Id. at 96-97. 
In this case, each admission as well as their cumulative 
erfect constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
~one of the testimony outlined here was relevant. It was 
presented by the State solely for its prejudicial impact. 
No material fact was advanced by the admission of testinony 
regarding the lights being on in the Nickles' home the night 
before the fire or the casserole being placed on a flower box 
outside. The State was speculating that Richard Nickles was 
pouring acetone in his home at that time. However, unrefuted 
testimony demonstrated that, if acetone was used, it had to 
have been poured much more recently that twenty-four hours 
before the explosion or there must have been an unbelievable 
amount of the substance in the home (T. 1888-89). 
There were repeated attempts to prejudice the jury's 
·;iew of the Nickles' motives with irrelevant evidence. There 
~~s no probative value to either the testimony regarding coverage 
,,f il t1vo-car 0arage as well as a family room or the testimony 
,,het_hcr the rebuilding bid would apply in Arizona. Neither was 
~ver raised by the Nickles. Moreover, the evidence of the 
µroximity of the business to Deseret Industries served no 
purpose other than to suggest that the Nickles purchased 
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their furniture there. This was total speculalinn, wilh 
no redeeming, probative value. 
The irrelevant testimony on accelerants other thcrn 
acetone had only one purpose - to confuse the jury on what 
caused the fire. The State advanced a theory of a device 
coupled with the use of acetone as an accelerant. 
was not viable. The additional evidence of other accelerants 
was designed only to obfuscate the real issue as to whether t~ 
State had met its burden of proving arson. 
Each time the trial court admitted this type of irrel-
evant evidence, the chances for a fair trial were eliminated. 
At a minimum, the cumulative effect of all of this testimon1· 
warrants a finding of abuse of discretion. 
B. HEARSAY 
Inadmissible hearsay prejudiced the appellants at tria'. 
The trial court permitted Jerry Taylor, an expert on explosivcz, 
to testify to what a County Attorney's office investigator tole 
him about the nature of the explosion and fire (T. 1062). 
The mere statement that an out-of-court declaration is 
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted cannot be used 
to circumvent the exclusion of hearsay evidence. In In re Est2'.: 
of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982) this Court held that a state· 
ment by the deceased favorable to the interest of her brother 
and made to another brother was inadmissible hearsay Id. at 
1117. 
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:,l though f ir:ding it to be harmless error in that case, the Court 
stated that the testimony that the deceased's brother had 
contributed money to buy her household items was offered for 
factual support of the theory that there was an on-going 
fiduciary relationship. The respondent had argued that the 
statement showed a pattern and was not offered for the truth 
of whether it had been given to the deceased. 
In this case, Taylor's testimony regarding investigator's 
information on the circumstances and cause of the fire and 
explosion was offered for the truth of the matter. This 
information was the basis for further testing by Taylor 
(T. 1062). Those facts had to be true in order for Taylor's 
subsequent testing to be valid. By allowing the evidence to 
come in as hearsay, defense counsel could not cross-examine the 
accuracy of the basis for Taylor's expert testimony. 6 
C. LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in effect at the 
time required that the witness have personal knowledge of or 
expertise on the subject as a prerequisite to testimony. In 
State v. Jones, 656 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1982) this Court affirmed 
the trial court's exclusion of testimony by a deputy county 
attorney that the crime charged fit the modus operandi of 
someone other than the defendant on the grounds that the attorney 
lacked any personal knowledge of the matter. In State v. Lamorie, 
,11 thoucrh the revised Utah Rules of Evidence might allow 
such testi~ony in as a basis for the expert's opinion, former 
Rule 56 did not. 
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610 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1980), this Court h'cld inadrnissibl'.' 
Colorado court records of the defendant's prior conv1ct1on 
on the grounds that the witness had no personal knowledge of 
the docu.'Tients. 
In this case, the vice-president of the corporation the 
runs the Carriage House furniture store was allowed to testif· 
that the records of the store did not show a particular sale 
to the Nickles (T. 1385). He had no direct knowledae of the 
records and no foundation was laid for the information to come 
in through the business record exception to hearsay. 7 The 
appellants were denied adeuqate confrontation of the evidence 
by this hearsay. 
D. FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE 
Numerous objections were made and overruled at trial 
when witnesses were asked questions which assumed facts not 
in evidence. The general principle that such questions are not 
appropriate has been voiced by both the Wyoming and Oregon 
courts. In DeBaca v. State, 404 P.2d 738 (Wyoming 1965), the 
court found no prejudicial error in allowing such questions i:-
that case, but restated the basis precept that it as inaripropnc· 
to ask a question on direct examination "•1,hich assumes erroneo~· 
that a material fact in issue has been ?roved. 
quoting from 4 Jones, Evidence, p. 1685 (5 ed.) The harm in 
such questions is both that it suggests the answer to the wit· 
7. Defense counsel moved to strike the testimony. The L:-ial c 
took the motion under advisement but apparently never ruled. 
was also no admonishment to the jury. It is clec.r that this '""' 
hearsay. 
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Jnd th:it it may be misleading. State v. Helmick, 423 P.2d 
~'J, 171 (Oregon 1967). In Helmick, the court criticized the 
,nal court for stating there was "nothing wrong" with a 
JL1est1on which assumed an assault had occurred (in an assault 
"'1ith intent to commit rape case), but found no error where 
the witness had previously testified to the actions constituting 
the :issault. 
There were six major objections during the Nickles' trial 
to questions assuming facts not in evidence. Each one alone, 
and in combination, prejudiced the appellants either by suggesting 
an answer or misleading the witness and the jury. 
A question asked of a friend of the Nickles regarding 
acetone being in suitcases was designed only for its prejudicial 
effect. The State asked Lynette Daniels if the Nickles had 
ever spilled acetone in their suitcases (T. 288). At that point, 
there had been no evidence introduced of acetone in any suitcases. 
It was also misleading in that subsequent testimony indicated a 
~ery small quantity of acetone, possibly from the glue in the 
suitcases (T. 1535-36). 
,\ question asked about "backup" devices to cause an 
explosion was total specualtion by the prosecutor. The prosecutor 
~sked his own expert if he had ever seen incendiary devices that 
had been used as backup devices (T. 1148). Not one shred of 
'""dence prior to this point or subsequent was introduced to 
show a backup device. This question clearly was misleading and 
confusing, designed only to speculate where there was no evidence. 
The State questioned a witness regarding what she had 
said to Richard Nickles on the telephone when there was no 
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evidence that he was the caller (T. 1269). She had C'.lcrc::l·/ 
testified that the caller purported to be Richard ~icklcs 
(T. 1267-68). The prosecutor's assur.1ption that the caller 
was the appellant usurped the jury's function in determining 
that issue and was confusing in allowing a fact to be stated 
by the prosecutor that was not evidence. 
The State was allowed to question a witness from a 
retail furniture store regarding a purchase by the Nickles 
despite the fact that the appellants never claimed to have 
purchased the furniture at the store. Although originally 
sustaining the objection (T. 1375), the trial court subsequentl~ 
permitted a question as to whether the I'ickles had purchased a 
dresser from Carria<Je House (T. 13 7 9) . As explained re pea tedl~ 
throu0hout the trial, the appellants used stores such as the 
Carriage House to obtain replacement costs and were not repre-
senting that they had purchased the item there (T. 1179, 1849). 
The State's sole purpose here was to mislead the jury into 
thinking that the Nickles were deceptive on their insurance 
claim since they had not purchased the dresser at the store 
listed. 
The State then questioned a witness, who had hung 
draperies for the Nickles, as to whether such draperies could 
be modified for a new home (T. 1724). This question assumed 
that the Nickles intended to take the draperies to a new houE 
The State had presented no such evidence. It is clear thLlt th' 
prosecutor asked this question in order to suggest to the jur; 
that the Nickles had removed the draperies from the house prior 
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t0 the fire. The State had no such evidence and, yet, was able 
Lu i~ntroduce the idea through innuendo. 
The prosecutor asked a question about a claim on the 
1roof of loss of use for a trailer used in Arizona (T. 1765-66). 
The appellants are unable to find such an item in the proof of 
loss of use. The purpose of the prosecutor was undoubtedly to 
su~gest that the Nickles had inappropriately claimed relocation 
expenses for their parents in Arizona. There was no such fact 
in evidence and the effect on the jury could only have been 
prejudicial to the Nickles. 
Each of the foregoing questions permitted evidence 
prejudicial to the appellants to be admitted. These were not 
situations, as in State v. Helmick, supra, where the witness 
had already testified to the facts that were then assumed in 
the question under different wording. In each instance, the 
~rosecutor used facts never placed into evidence. The goal of 
the prosecutor was attained; he introduced speculation for 
consideration by the jury without any evidence to support such 
allegations. 
E. EVIDENCE BEYOND THE WITNESS' EXPERTISE 
At three points during the trial, defense counsel objected 
to cuestions calling for answers outside the witness' expertise. 
-nunty Attorney investigator Olin Yearby testified about sources of 
'''nit ion (T. 388-89). Aaron .l\lma Nelson, the attorney for the 
insurance COQpany, testified regarding what the insurance policy 
"1ould cover (T. 1168). Iraj Aalam of Sunglo Energy Systems, Inc., 
called by the defense as an expert in heat loss analysis, was 
forced to answer a question on fuel-air explosions (T. 1609) · 
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Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of C','1dc,nc0, :r 
effect at the time of trial, an expert witness could tcstif 
in the form of an opinion if the basis for the opinion w;E 
known to the witness and "within the scope of the special 
knowledge, skill, experience, or training" of the witness. 
The purpose of qualifying an expert is to be sure that the 
question will be answered by a person who is qualified to 
answer it. 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Co=on Law, EiSSS 
(3d. ed. 1979). The witness :nust, as \'ligmore stated, be fit 
to answer on that point. Id. This Court, in Park v. Farns1-1ort~, 
622 P. 2d 788, 790 (Utah 1980), found the trial court had not 
erred by excluding testimony of a witness called to interpret 
field notes of a survey because he had neither expertise nor 
personal knowledge of the survey. 
The rationale of Park v. Farnsworth applies to this c~s, 
Olin Yearby was trained in processing crime scenes and had 
received training in arson cases (T. 369). f{owever, there was 
no foundation as to what training provided him with expertise 
on sources of ignition. By allowing his answer in, the tr1a: 
court erroneously allowed the Jury to perceive the witness 
as someone who was fit to conclude that there were no heat 
sources in the house. This same prejudice arose when the atto' 
was permitted to testif~· as to policy coverage ciithout dernonstc 
personal knowledge or expertise in policj• covera')e. i\lthouc~:. 
perhaps unusual to object to the lack of expertise of a defens 
witness, Mr. Aalam was qualified only in heat loss anal;s1s. 
The State, by its questioning a fuel-air explosion, was tr:in1 
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t.c' rcsL1tc its cilsc throu']h an inappropriate witness. In 
"·\·, instilnce, the witness was not qualified to answer the 
,,u_ st ion ilS ked. The danger of presenting erroneous information 
1_) th,c jury was present. 
this testimony. 
F. SPECULATION 
The trial court erred in permitting 
It is inappropriate and prejudicial to ask a question 
which calls for a sceculative answer. Although the appellants 
hJ.'.'e found no cases directly on point, according to l'/igmore 
an opinion which is a mere guess is inadmissible because a 
witness must have both the mental power or capacity to acquire 
~nowledge in the subject of testimony as well as intelligence 
uoon the subject of testimony. 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law, §651 (3d. ed. 1979). Thus experience and 
::nowledge provide the ground rules for testimony rather than 
speculation and conclusion. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
~:1dence in effect at the time of the trial embraces this 
concept b~ requiring the witness to have personal knowledge 
0• the su~ject of the testimony. There were four major times 
Jur1ng the trial of the appellants where speculative answers 
·1cr2 admitted over the objection of defense counsel. 
A loan officer was asked whether anything would have 
·r0r~u~cd someone from removing furniture from the house after 
ti:,·. lc•iln but before the fire (T. 463). This question was clearly 
,;, signed to imply that furniture had in fact been removed when 
there was no such evidence to support the allegation. 
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An explosives expert was asked to speculate whether 
simulated explosion experiments would ~e more complicated 
by wind coming through a flue in the furnace or fireplace than 
by a broken window (T. 1098). Here the prosecutor v.'os tryir.c; 
to bolster the State's ineffective experiments by conjecture. 
David Osborne, a chemist called by the defense, was 
asked whether someone in the boat business would have acetone 
in a large quantity (T. 1544). There had been no evidence that 
the Nickles had any recent involvement in the boat business. 
The State was attempting to suggest a source for the acetone 
which was without any evidentiary foundation. 
The appellants also objected as speculation to a 
question whether it would be possible to modify the draperies 
in the ~ickles' home to be used in another house as calling for 
a speculative answer (T. 1724). This question was discussed 
infra at 42-43 as it also assumed a fact not in evidence. 
The State was trying to imply that the Nickles had removed the 
draperies prior to the fire without any basis for such an 
allegation. 
The speculative evidence pen:iitted here by itself, but 
especially coupled with the evidence introduced by questions 
assuming facts not in evidence (see infra at 40-43), constitutes 
prejudicial error. The only goal of the prosecutor was to 
introduce facts for which he had no real support. 
permitted to engage in guesswork with this evidence. 
verdict was not based on admissible evidence. 
Their 
G. NON-RESPmJSIVE ANS\'lER 
During the trial, the State's expert, Jerry Taylor, 
oiuntecred that he had read about flammable liquids in 
~cneral (T. 1099). This response was totally unresponsive to 
Lhe ouestion asked. The witness was asked whether an air 
source such as an open flue would complicate an experiment with 
the so-called "device" any more than a broken window (T. 1098). 
The court had just overruled the defense objection made on the 
grounds of speculation when the witness volunteered that he 
had read about the characteristics of flammable liquids in 
general (T. 1099). 
Although a non-responsive answer may stand if it is 
otherwise competent, Peoole v. Wong Chuey, 117 Cal. 624, 49 
P. 833 (1897), there is great prejudice in irrelevant and 
otherwise inadmissible volunteered statements. The statement 
by the State's expert was gratuitous. It implied an expertise 
on the specific tests and substances in this case from merely 
re,1ding about the general characteristics of flammable liquids. 
The court should have granted the motion to strike. 
H. ARGUMENTATIVE QUESTIONS 
~t several points during the trial, the prosecutor 
o•·erstepped the bounds of appropriate questioning by asking 
1r1umentative questions. The only prupose was to prejudice 
'h~ Jury against the appellants. 
Although the appellants have found no Utah cases 
s~eci:ically on argumentative questions, the rationale of cases 
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balancing the prejudicial effect Of the e•1idem~,, ,Hp inst its 
probative value would apply here. Rule 45 of the_' llL'th !<ules 
of Evidence, in effect at the time of the trial, prnv1des that 
court has discretion to exclude evidence if the preJudicial 
effect outweighs the probative value. In Reiser v. Lohner, ~' 
this Court sustained the trial court's exclusion of possijly 
negligent collateral medical test as irrelevant and potential!~ 
prejudicial evidence under Rule 45 where it did not affect the 
malpractice claim at issue. The same reasoning applied L1 :!art1· 
Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, where this Court noted the addi ticn2: 
dangers of confusin0 or misleading the jury, sustaining the tri2_ 
court's exclusion of we2~~er conditions twe~ty miles 3way. 
At one point, a witness was asked whether the insurancE 
co~pany's attorney and defense counsel were at the scene of the 
fire as a result of a Motion to Compel Discovery 0y the a;:ipellu;.t: 
The prosecutor had to know the existence of the motion was 
irrelevant. The question was raised purely for its prejudicia, 
8 
effect in implying that the appellants were litigious. 
In another instance, a defense witness, who had an 
expertise in air exchange, was questioned about changing 
quantities of acetone and the possibility of fuel-air explosions 
(T. 1609). The purpose was simply to imply that the witness he3 
no expertise. Such an irrelevant line of questioning unfairl~ 
prejudiced the credibility of this witness. 
The prosecutor next tackled Kin Nickles, the daughter r· 
the appellants, asking whether she had thrown her porn-porns over 
8. The witness responded that he did not know. The trial cour: 
allowed it to stand because the -:inswer was alread'.· in, but faile: 
to admonish the jury to disreoard the answer. -
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th neighbors' fence when it was clear the explosion had carried 
eiJe uom-poms to where they were found (T. 1814). This bordered 
c~ 0adgering the witness. It was clearly designed to attack 
th~ appellants case in an improper manner. 
The prosecutor also used this technique with his own 
witness. Glenn Barnrnerlin, an insurance adjuster, was asked 
if he had told the Nickles they could claim items on their 
croof of loss that they had not had in their house (T. 2050). 
It is obvious that the prosecutor used this question to imply 
that the Nickles had in fact claimed items which they never 
had in their home. This baseless question could serve only to 
orejudice the jury; there was no probative worth to the question. 
Each inadmissible statement, as well as the cumulative 
impact, created reversible error in this case. Although we 
cannot know what evidence the jury considered in reading its 
vercict, the amount of inappropriate evidence that was admitted 
in this case cannot be ignored. The jury was bombarded by it. 
The cumulative effect, if not the individual errors, 
~arrants a new trial. In Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 
(nkl. Crim. App. 1980), the court stated: 
When a review of the entire record reveals 
numerous irregularities that tend to pre-
judice the rights of a defendant and where 
an accumulation of errors denies a defendant 
a fair trial, the case will be reversed, even 
though one of the errors, standing alone, would 
not be ample to justify reversal. 
,~oodon, the court reversed where there was prosecutorial 
,, sconduct in cross-examination and closing a:cgument. 
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The prejudicial effect of the errors in this case 
cannot be quantified. Nevertheless, no Juror could have 
ignored all of the inadmissible evidence. Hearsay, irrelevant 
evidence, prejudicial facts not in evidence, speculations, 
opinions outside an expert's area, facts of which witnesses 
had no direct knowledge, and inflammatory argumentative 
questions were erroneously permitted. The appellants are 
entitled to a new trial 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT A CONVICTION ON INSURANCE FRAUD 
NECESSITATED MORE THAN INACCURATE ESTI!!ATES. 
The appellants requested that the court instruct the 
jury on the definition of an estimate and also that insurance 
fraud involved more than an error in estimation. They submitteC 
an instruction which defined "estimate" as "an opinion, a 
rough or approximate calculation of the cost of an item." This 
was given in Instruction No. 19. The appellants also requested, 
however, that the court include, as an element to be proved, t~2: 
on the proof of loss "said submissions were :nore than 'esti:-.at22 
Defendant's proposed Instruction No. 14. The court refused to 
give this part of the instruction and the appellants to ol: e::c2: 
to it (T. 2091). 
This Court has addressed the issue of appropriately 
instructing the jury. In Penelko, Inc. v. John Price ;\ssocicite2. 
Inc., 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982), in a civil suit involving 
damages between a lessor and lessee, the Court found no error 
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the instructions on damages, but noted: 
The purpose of jury instructions is to 
inform the jury of applicable law in terms 
that they can readily understand. 
Id. at 1234. In a criminal context, the Court has reversed where 
the jury instructions impermissibly created the possiblity of 
interpreting a presumption as conclusive. State v. Walton, 
6~G P. 2d 639 (Utah 1982). 
The possibility of incorrectly interpreting the court's 
instructions occurred in this case by the failure to give the 
requested instruction. The court apparently agreed that the 
distinction between an estimate and insurance fraud was 
significant as it instructed the jury on the definition of 
"estimate." The definition by itself, however, left a void 
as to what the jury should do if they found that any errors in 
the proof of loss were due to estimates. Without the requested 
clarification that insurance fraud required more than mere 
errors in estimation, the jury may well have found the appellants 
~uilty without sufficient evidence of criminal conduct. The 
instructions as given, even when taken as a whole, were 
misleading on this issue. ''/here it cannot be determined whether 
the jury decided the case on an impermissible basis, the Court 
should reverse and order a new trial as in State v. Walton, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants' convictions should be reversed. The 
e"1dcncc introduced at trial was insufficient to connect either 
·· th~ 3ppellants to the cause of the fire or to prove an intent 
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to defraud on the insurance claim. 
by the erroneous admission of the contents of a t~lcphone call 
allegedly made by Mr. Nickles. The lack o~ an impartial 
prosecutor denied the appellants a fair trial. The multitude 
of evidence erroneously admitted also abrogated the appellants' 
right to a fair trial. And finally, the jury should have been 
instructed on the distinction between inaccurate estimates and 
insurance fraud. For all of these reasons, the resulting 
convictions should be reversed and a new trial should be 
ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY 19 84. 
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